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Managerial Perceptions and
The Normative Model of Strategy Formulation

ABSTRACT
The normative model of strategy formulation has long been popular.
However, its validity may be questioned. For example, some literature
suggests that managers' perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and of
their firm's external environment (both important in the normative strategy
formulation model) may ·vary by management level. Differences likely result
because of individuals' cognitive schemas, which include their cognitive
bia·s es. In turn, systematic errors may occur in managerial decisions.
Results from the research reported herein support the notion that managers'
perceptions of a firm's strengths and weaknesses and of environmental
uncertainty vary by managerial level. Differences in these perceptions
were discovered to be more significant within each firm. These results
suggest the need to evaluate how the normative approach to strategy formulation is used in firms that solicit inputs from .individuals occupying
different managerial levels.

Introduction
From a normative perspective, the formulation of strategy is seen by some
(e.g., Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Andrews, 1980; Porter, 1980) to begin with
assessments of a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses and its external
opportunities and threats.

While popular, this is not the only perspective on

formulation of strategies.

In fact, some (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973, 1978; Bower

and Doz, 1979; Quinn, 1980) argue that the normative view may be oversimplified
or even inaccurate as a description of strategy formulation

pro~esses.

Huff

(1982) suggests that the influence of. a firm's experiences in a particular
industry setting may shape strategy formulation processes significantly.

As

such, the nature of formal strategy formulation processes may be altered
substantially.

Nonetheless, the normative view continues to influence strongly

both the teaching of and research into strategy formulation activities.

With

respect to teaching, established textbooks (e.g., Newman and Logan, 1981;
Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hammermesh, and Porter, 1982) promote the normative
model.

In terms of research, several methodologies that can be used to conduct

external environmental analyses appear in the literature (e.g., Porter, 1980;
Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980).

Few studies, however, have examined approaches and

techniques used to assess a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses.

This lack

of research is noteworthy, since identification of strengths and weaknesses is
considered to be a critical, initial step in the normative view of strategy formulation processes (Higgins, 1983).
Because of the paucity of research, very little is known about how organizational strengths and weaknesses are actually determined and by whom.

In this

current study, it is proposed that the assessment process can not be separated
from the assessor(s).

Evidence is presented supporting the position that actual

assessments of strengths and weaknesses will
different management levels.

~ary

substantially

a~ong

Stated differently, it is possible that

and within
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assessments and the assessment processes are, to some degree, a product of the
assessor(s).

As such, the accuracy and/or appropriateness of assessments that

serve as inputs to a firm's strategy formulation process may be subject to
debate.

In addition, it suggests that research into strategy formulation pro-

cesses should be sensitive to the perceiver and how the individual perceptions
are factored into the outcome.

A similar view was advanced by Pearce (1983) who

argued that relative orientations toward examinations of internal and external
environmental factors is a product of the individual.

This perspective differs

somewhat, Pearce (1983) argued, from the traditional one which suggests that persons outside a firm should be appointed as board members to assure a proper
orientation to external environmental conditions.
Several objectives were pursued in conducting this study.

First, the

researchers sought to establish that assessments of a firm's strengths and
weaknesses can be expected to vary systematically and substantially among managerial levels.

Recent research in cognitive psychology, coupled with

established literature in organizational theory, support this expected outcome.
A second objective was to subject this expectation to empirical examination.
This was accomplished with data collected from separate managerial levels in
three different firms.

A final objective was to examine how a key environmental

component--perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU)--affects these relationships.

PEU was included in this design since the concept occupies a central

position in several research literatures and evidence suggests that it may
affect relationships evaluated in this study.

Implications of the results are

discussed with regard to •trategy formulation processes and for future research
efforts.
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Theoretical Review
In this section, relevant research and theory are reviewed and hypotheses
established.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Only one major systematic study of how organizations define strengths and
weaknesses has been completed (Stevenson, 1976).

In his research, Stevenson

asked fifty managers, from six companies, for their evaluation of corporate
strengths and weaknesses and the reasons underlying the evaluations.

The

sample was structured to yield a relatively broad representation of managers
within each firm.

From his informal analysis of 191 responses to an open ended

research question he concluded that:
The .results of the study brought into serious question the
value of formal assessment approaches. It was found that
an individual's cognitive perceptions of the strengths and
weaknesses of his organization were strongly influenced by
factors associated with the individual and not only by the
organization's attributes. Position in the organization,
perceived role, and type of responsibility so strongly influenced the assessment that the objective reality of the
situation tended to be overwhelmed. In addition there were
wide variations among standards of measurement and criteria
for judgment employed. (p. 55)
While potentially interesting, Stevenson's methodology creates some concern
regarding the findings' validity.

No statistical analyses were conducted to

determine the significance of the differences found.
tic~lar

Simple percentages of par-

responses were tabulated and informal comparisons made.

A second con-

cern is that a simple verbal or written response to a question may not be
accurate.

Decision makers' descriptions of their own policies often are inac-

curate (Hoffman, 1960; Slavic, 1969; Balke, Hammond

&

Meyer, 1973).

stated policies and intentions often vary from what is actually used.

Similarly,
Argyris

and Schon (1974) describe this as the difference between ''espoused theories" of
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action and "theories in use" that actually govern behavior.

These researchers

suggest that a person's "theory in use" cannot be obtained simply by asking for
it.

Rather, it must be constructed by observing and recording the person's

behavior in the situation under question.

Stated differently, what people say

in response to the question, "What are your firm's strengths and weaknesses?"
may be different from the set of believed strengths and weaknesses they use in
making actual strategic decisions.
As noted, Stevenson's (1976) work is the only major study to examine how
strengths and weaknesses are assessed in organizations.

However, a similar con-

cept (distinctive competencies) has been investigated by Snow and Hrebiniak
0980).

This concept was operationalized originally by Selznick 0957), who

suggested that a distinctive competence represents those things that an organization does especially well in comparison to its competitors.

This definition,

or a slight variant, remains an integral component of strategy researchers'
(e.g., Schendel and Hofer, 1978; Grant and King, 1982; Hitt and Ireland, 1984)
frame-works.

In essence, a distinctive competence may be thought of as a subset

of a firm's strengths.

It is the set of strengths that determine what an orga-

nization can perform especially well in comparison to its competitors and that
can be manipulated effectively to achieve a competitive advantage.
Snow and Hrebiniak 0980) found that managerial perceptions of distinctive
competencies may vary within organizations.

These researchers also charac-

terized distinctive competencies within strategic business units in their sample
of 88 firms.
sample.

This was done through analysis of perceptions of managers in their

Hitt and Ireland 0984) also relied on upper-level managerial percep-

tions to examine corporate level distinctive competencies in 185 firms.
However, results from both studies are restricted to perceptions from only upper
level managers.
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Assessment of the Environment
Although only a few studies have focused on issues relevant to the identification of organizational strengths and weaknesses, assessments of external
environmental conditions have been examined more frequently (e.g., Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967).

Research focusing on external assessment processes has been

categorized by Bourgeois ( 1980).

Results appearing in both the strategic man-

agement and organizational theory literatures were included in his analysis.
Among the most important of these research efforts are the seminal studies of
Lawren.c e and Lorsch 0967) and Emery and Trist (1965).

These researchers found

that a firm's actions are affected significantly by individuals' perceptions of
degrees of environmental uncertainty.

Included within the range of organiza-

tional actions affected by perceived environmental uncertainty is the assessment
of external environments.

In view of this and other evidence recorded in the

literature, some (e.g., Duncan, 1972; Downey, Hell riegel and Slocum, 1975;
Boulton, Lindsay, Franklin and Rue, 1982; Hitt, Ireland and Palia, 1982) have
concluded that PEU is indeed a significant environmental variable.

As an indi-

cation of this importance, PEU was one of the key environmental variables
Bourgeois 0980) suggested should be examined when studying corporate actions.
Similarly, Hambrick (1981) noted that both strategy and environment are crucial
contingencies for organizations.
interwoven.

In fact, these two variables are inextricably

For example, Lindsay and Rue (1980) and, to a lesser extent,

Boulton et al. (1982) found environmental uncertainty to be related to a firm's
strategic planning processes.

Similarly, Dirsmith and Covaleski (1983) found

that the environment exerts a strong influence on a firm's strategic norms.
Given this evidence, it may not be surprising that Hrebiniak and Snow (19.80)
discovered interrelationships between perceptions of enviromental uncertainty
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and intraorganizational influence.

Thus, the degree of PEU may affect strategic

planning processes as well as norms and perceptions of internal strengths and
weaknesses.
Despite its significance, concerns regarding how PEU is conceptualized and
operationalized have surfaced.

For example, Downey and Ireland 0979) argued

that assessors' perceptions can be measured either quantitatively or qualitatively.

Similarly, the assessor can be asked to evaluate either quantitative or

qualitative environmental attributes specified by the researcher.
nations of these variables may be appropriate for use.
the researcher to be aware of the outcome sought.

All combi-

The challenge is for

In the current study, man-

agers were asked to evaluate quantitative measures of qualitative environmental
attributes.
Perceptions of environmental uncertainty may also vary by managerial level.
Cox, Hitt and Stanton (1978) found PEU to vary by an administrator's hierarchical level (top, middle or lower).

These differences may be accounted for in the

context of the jobs at each managerial level and by managers' previous experiences.

Each managerial level is assigned unique responsibilities that should be

consistent with the scope of both the firm's activities and its relevant external environment.
agerial hierarchy.

The scope enlarges as one

progresses to the top of the man-

In addition, Kiesler and Sproull (1982) note that each

manager has distinctive experiences, and that he/she will tend to overgeneralize
the extent to which a few similar attributes of a current situation represent an
analogue to past experiences.

Since managers at each level are more likely to

have similar experiences but differences (at least in extent) in experiences
between levels, individuals' perceptions of environmental uncertainty may vary.
Finally, Thompson (1967) hypothesized that organizations seek to seal off or
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buffer their technical cores from environmental influences.

This suggests that

managers in the technical core (generally lower level managers) may be relatively naive with respect to external environmental conditions.
In suuunary, the literature suggests that perceived environmental uncertainty
influences strategic processes (e.g., determination of strengths and weaknesses)
and that these influences may vary by managerial level.
Cognition and Varying Perceptions
Individuals' basic, cognitive properties result in perceptions of the
environment and of internal strengths and weaknesses.

These perceptions may

vary as a function of managerial level in the organization.
These differences suggest that managers should not be viewed as "faceless
abstractions," but as individuals with multiple characteristics (e.g., age, personal history, values and education).

These characteristics may vary signifi.-

cantly across managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).

Given their individuality,

managers bring somewhat unique perspectives to processes used to evaluate the
organization and its internal and external environments.

Few organizational

events are approached by a manager as being totally unique and requiring systematic analytical study.
knowledge systems.
sch~mas),

Instead, they are processed through preexisting

Known as schemasl, (see Norman, 1976, for a discussion of

these systems represent beliefs, theories and propositions that have

developed over time based on the manager's personal experiences.

At a broader

unit of analysis, Huff (1982) implied the possibility that organizations'

lBrief and Downey (1983) discuss the role "implicit theories" play in the
structuring of organizations. While differences do exist, a manager's schemas
and his/her implicit theories tap -similar dimensions of an individual's cognLti ve makeup.
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actions can be characterized as schemas.

An organizational schema is primarily

a product of managers' interpretations of experiences while operating within
certain industries.
Schemas permit managers to categorize an event, assess its consequences, and
consider appropriate actions (including doing nothing) and to do so rapidly and
often

efficiently~

Without schemas, a manager, and ultimately the organizations

with which he/she is associated, would become paralyzed by the need to analyze
"scientifically" an enormous number of ambiguous and uncertain situations.

In

other words, managers must be able to scan environments selectively so that
timely decisions can be made (Hambrick, 1982).

The selection of environmental

elements to be scanned is likely affected by a manager's schema.
Unfortunately, schemas are not infallible guides to. the organization and its
environments.

In fact, some are relatively inaccurate representations of the

world, particularly as conditions change.

Furthermore, events often are not

labeled accurately _and sometimes are processed through inaccurate and/or
incomplete knowledge structures.
For the purposes of this research, it is important to understand what
managers' schemas actually represent.

Kiesler and Sproul 0982) offer the

following concise description:
Managers operate on mental representations of the world and
those representations are likely to be of histori~al environments rather than of current ones. (p. 557)
It is this experiential or historical nature that is critical.

Simply put, it

is likely that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and the external environment will vary systematically across managerial levels.

The variance may be

expected since managers' mental representations of conditions probably will be
historical in nature and the historical experiences on which they are based
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likely have varied across managerial levels.

This is not to say that managers

at each level share a common overall history, but rather that they often have
some significant common historical experiences that vary across levels.

As a

result, measurable differences in perceptions across levels may be anticipated.
For example, managers at each organizational level will tend, on the average, to
be near the same age.

Age variance across levels will be significantly greater

than within levels (Hall, 1976; Veiga, 1981).

Being of roughly the same age,

cohort managers at each level will tend to have similar life experiences and
resultant values and beliefs (stored as schemas).

For example, few would argue

that people who were draft age during the Second World War and people who were
draft age during the Vietnam War tend to have, on the average, values and
perspectives about war . (stored as schemas) that differ significantly.

In other

words, different cohorts have different schemas simply as a result of different
experience bases that are a product of broad social trends and events.
the case of "participative management."

Consider

Younger professionals (those under 35)

are more likely to see the absence of participative management as a weakness of
the organization than are older professionals (those over 55) (Business Week,
July 2, 1984).
Furthermore, members of each managerial level are likely to be near the same
organizational age (i.e., to have been members of the organization or a similar
one for about the same period of time).

This suggests that they probably have

experienced similar histories of organizational event.s.

Stated differently, the

organizational history on which various schemas are based will tend to be similar within each managerial level and tend to vary across managerial levels
(e.g., at higher levels schemas will be based on a longer historial organizational tecord).
A second, general reason why perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and
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environmental uncertainty are likely to vary as a function of managerial level
is the concept of cognitive biases.

The psychology of cognitive biases is the

study of how people (managers), in making decisions, sometimes make systematic
(and often severe) errors (Tversky arid Kahneman's [1974] work is an excellent
introduction to and survey of this literature).

When dealing with uncertain and

complex tasks, people (managers) often rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles.

Doing so simplifies the decision process significantly.

In

general, these heuristics are useful, but on some occasions they can result in
critical errors.

Recent evidence suggests that this may occur often in man-

agerial selection decisions (Hitt and Barr, 1984).
of

Reliance on a limited number

heuristics in making strategic deiisions could be disasterous.
For the purposes of this research, the most important of these heuristics

may be the availability one (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973 for a thorough
discussion).

Basically, this heuristic leads people to make decisions by using

information that can be brought to the mind easily (i.e., information that is
"available").

For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) indicate that one may

assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such
occurrences among one's acquaintances, even if it can be demonstrated that it is
an inappropriate basis for drawing such a conclusion.

In the present case, it

seems that the information that is "available" will vary by managerial level.
In general, this occurs because managers at different levels tend to concentrate
on different tasks and hence, deal with different sets of information.

~or

example, a plant inventory manager (typically a lower level managerial position)
is likely to have a great deal of information related to inventories available
to him.

This information would be almost totally obscured at the corporate

level.

By contrast, top managers are likely to have significant amounts of

information regarding cash flow.

These data would not .be as relevant at lower
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managerial levels.
Similarly, there may be some differences in the types of information managers in different organizations seek.

These differences may be attributed

largely to different industries and the types of information most critical in
each industry setting.
Closely related to the concept of availability is the concept of salience.
As Kiesler and Sproul (1982) state:
••• people attend to and encode salient material--events that
are unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, sudden,
brightly lit, colorful, alone, or sharply drawn ••• In sum,
salient information has greater weight in the determinance
of what is remembered and how well it is organized. (p. 556)
Hence, salience is likely to determine how well remembered and organized (i.e.,
how "available") information is.
irrelevant at another.

What is salient at one level may be totally

For example, at the lower levels of management, events

or information, such as low or high morale of production employees, loss of an
account because of quality problems, an unfair dismissal, and a new machining
center, are likely to be salient.

In contrast, examples of salient events or

information at the top management level would include:

a sudden drop in stock

price, a loss of market share, a change in the ·bonus plan, and a change in
government antitrust policy.
Hypotheses
The evidence evaluated herein suggests two hypotheses and one research
question.
Hypothesis 1:

Perceptions of strength and weakness indicators vary by

management level (top, middle, and lower).
Hypothesis 2:

Perceptions of environmental uncertainty vary by management

level (top, middle, and lower).
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Research Question:

Is perceived environmental uncertainty a moderator of

the relationship between strength and weakness indicators and firm effectiveness, as perceived by managers?
The hypotheses and research question are important, for several reasons.
For example, if perceptions do vary, questions of "true," "best," "appropriate"
or "weighted" (what weighting?) perceptions become important.
researchers measure PEU?

How should a planning process be designed to account

for differences in perceptions?
should it?

How should

How can perceptual variance be reduced, or

Confirmation of the hypotheses suggests that these questions and

others become significant issues for future research.

The view that only top

management perceptions are important in strategy formulation processes is
naive.

Research conducted by Bower (1970), Prahalad (1976) and Burgleman

(1983), among others, has established that the entire strategy formulation process is diffuse and involves several management levels.
Method
Sample
Data were collected from top, middle, and appropriate lower-level managers
from three firms among the largest 500 companies in South America.
were headquartered in Venezuela, one in Brazil.

Three different industries

(oil tools, petrochemical and brewing) were represented.
managers:

Two firms

The sample included 56

12 top managers; 24 middle managers; and 20 lower-level managers

(only lower-level managers with input into and/or involvement with the strategic
planning process were included).

Of these 56 managers, 31 were from the oil

tools firm (7 top, 6 middle, 18 lower), 21 from the brewing firm (4 top, 15
middle, 2 lower), and four from the petrochemical firm (1 top, 3 middle).
differential~

relative proportions from each firm reflect the approach used

The
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in the strategic planning process and firm structures.

For example, all

management levels are highly involved in strategic planning in the oil tools
firm.

However, the strategic planning process in the petrochemical firm is more

centralized with involvement of only key management staff.
Many of the managers sampled were educated in the U.S. and most had attended
management development seminars on strategic planning processes.
firms uses a "normative" strategic planning process.

Each of the

Thus, although some

cultural differences may exist, this group of managers and firms provides a
representative sample of how managers apply the normative strategy formulation
process.

Data Collection Procedure
Analysis of internal factors (strength and weakness indicators) used by
managers in determining strategic actions required a procedure to define the
factors utilized accurately.

Stevenson 0976) conducted personal interviews.

However, as noted previously, evidence exists suggesting that managers' descriptions of factors used in making decisions may be inaccurate (Hoffman, 1960;
Slovic, 1969; Balke, Hammond & Meyer, 1973).

Similarly, Hambrick 0982)

suggested that managers may be unable to describe their actual, environmental
scanning behaviors accurately.

Argyris and Schon (1974) argue that, in these

instances, a procedure must be used to capture "theories in use" rather than
"espoused theories."
The policy-capturin g procedure (Slavic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Slovic,
Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1977) used to obtain a major part of the data
(decision factors used in determining strategic actions) satisfies the concern
raised by Argyris and Schon (1974).

Policy capturing has been used

succes~fully
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in similar instances (e.g., Hitt & Middlemist, 1979; Hitt, Ireland, Keats &
Vianna, 1983).

Use of this procedure requires that a comprehensive list of

decision factors (strength and weakness indicators, in this instance) be identified.

A panel of four Latin American managers, each with extensive experience

in strategic management, was used to develop a list of possible decision factors.

Stevenson's (1976) compilation served as a foundation.

Based on the

pan.e 1 members' experiences and knowledge sets, some factors were added while
others were deleted.

The final list included 21 factors (as shown in Table 1)

that may be important indicators of a firm's health (based on internal
evaluations).

Insert Table 1 about here

The policy

capturing_~ procedure

specifies that managerial decisions be

observed so that models of the factors used in the decisions and their respective importance weightings can be developed.

Doing this requires that descrip-

tions of multiple simulated firms be developed in terms of the indicators of
firm health (decision factors) varying the levels of these indicators.

Once

developed, managers are asked to assume that the simulated firm's objectives,
products and technologies are similar to those of their own firm.

Each

simulated firm is then to be examined and its effectiveness evaluated.

Treating

the effectiveness ratings as dependent variables and the 21 indicators (with
levels varying between each case) as independent variables, regression models
can be constructed denoting the decision factors used in the managers' effectiveness evaluations and their weightings.
Thirty simulated cases were developed in whieh the

lev~ls

of the i ndependent
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variables were randomly varied on a scale of one (poor), two (bad), three
(average), four (good), five (excellent).

The random assignment of levels of

the independent variables was designed to control for researcher bias and potential collinearity.

This procedure is described fully in Hitt and Middlemist

(1979) and Hitt et al. (1983).

A sample case is shown in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

The number of cases was limited to 30 for reasons of response practicality.
Managers were given the thirty cases and were instructed to rate the effectiveness of each firm on a scale of one (very
effective).

inef~ective)

to seven (very

They were asked to rate the effectiveness of each firm based on the

indicator levels presented in each case.

The managers were told that the indi-

cator levels were determined by a managerial audit.

Previous research suggests

that managers search for the indicators most important to their own strategic
actions, observe the indicator levels presented in the case, and decide on the
simulated firm's effectiveness (Hitt and Middlemist, 1979).
Each manager completed an effectiveness rating for 30 simulated firms,
yielding a sample size of 30 x 56 or 1680 observations.
almost identical to a repeated measures design.

This procedure is

Precedent exists for the

assumption that each case represents an independent observation (Stewart &
Gelberd, 1972; Hitt & Middlemist, 1979; Hitt et al., 1983).
Indicator Independence
The random assignment of indicator levels should disallow collinearity among
the independent variables, thereby avoiding the effect found by Dudycha and
Naylor 0966) [that interrelationships among decision cues (indicators in this
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research) affected raters' judgments].

An intercorrelation matrix was

constructed to examine the independence among the indicators.

The matrix shows

the bivariate Pearson product-moment correlations for each pairing of 21 indicators over the 30 cases (n • 30).
As shown in Table 3, the highest r between any pair of indicators was .49
yielding a highest common variance of .24.

Furthermore, 98 percent of the pair-

wise r's were below .4 and 87 percent were below .3.

The lack of collinearity

lends more credence to the decision models derived.

Insert Table 3 about here

Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
A second data set acquired through the managers' responses concerned perceived environmental uncertainty.

The Miles and Snow 0978) PEU instrument,

modified for the Latin American environment, was used to collect these data.

As

used in this research, the instrument contained six scales, composed of 25
items, that measured perceived uncertainty in six major dimensions of a firm's
external environment:

(1) suppliers of raw materials and parts; (2)

competitors' behavior; (3) clients; (4) financial/capital markets; (5) government regulatory agency actions; and (6) behavior of labor unions.
Managers were asked to evaluate the predictability of each item of the
environment on a seven-point Likert-type scale.

Means from each of the six

scales were obtained and summed for the total PEU scale.

To assess instrument

reliability, coeffi.c ient alphas were calculated for each scale.
alphas were acceptable except for the "clients" scale.
one item resulted in an

~cceptable

All coefficient

However, elimination of

coefficient for the scale.

The six coef-
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ficient alphas were:

suppliers of raw materials and parts (.69); competitors'

behavior (.66); clients (.60); financial/capit al markets (.75); government regulatory agency actions (.89); and behavior of labor unions (.78).
Results
Individual decision models were examined first to insure the effort and consistency of each subject manager.
(1983) used the heuristic of R2
further analyses.

Hitt and Middlemist (1979) and Hitt et al.

> .40

for inclusion of individual models in

Hitt and Middlemist (1979) conducted post hoc analyses that

supported the appropriateness of this heuristic.
in this study.

This heuristic was also used

Stepwise linear regression analysis, with the effectiveness

ratings as the dependent variable

and indicator values as the independent

variables, was used to develop individual decision models.

Slavic et al. 0977)

concluded that the linear model · does a remarkably good job of predicting human
judgments.
p

The criterion for inclusion of indicator variables in the model was

< •05.
Only one individual manager's model (R2 • .134) failed to satisfy the

heuristic.

All other individual manager's models had R2's greater than .40.

The highest individual model R2 was .955.

< .40

Excluding the one data set with an R2

resulted in a sample size of 55 managers and 1650 observations.

The next step in the analysis was to develop a regression model (in
stepwise fashion) for the combined sample of 55 managers and 1650 obaervations.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.

There were 12 statistically

significant indicator variables and the model had an R2

=

predictor in the combined model was "the planning system."

.375.
An R2

The strongest

=

.375 with

individual model R2's greater than .40 indicates only moderate agreement among
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the managers.

Differences may exist by management level and/or environmental

uncertainty.
Insert Table 4 about here

Management Level
Regression models were developed to examine the important strength and
weakness indicators for each management level.
shown in Table 5.

Results of these analyses are

The regression models for top managers and for lower-level

managers show some improvement (gains in R2) over the aggregate managerial
model.

However, there seems to be less consistency among middle managers.

Comparing the models across management levels suggests some differences (e.g.,
the organizational form and structure indicator appears only in the lower-level
management model while the distribution channels indicator appears only in the
top management model).

Weights of the indicators also varied between models;

however, the differences were not large.

Therefore, further analyses were

necessary.

Regression models were developed for each management level within

each firm.

Results of these analyses are shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8.

models differences by level become more distinct.

In these

There.were four of fourteen

indicators used that were common in all managerial models in the oil tools firm.
Only one indicator out of eleven used was common to all models in the brewery.
No common indicators among the two managerial models in the petrochemical firm
were found.

Weights and signs of some of the common indicators (in two or three

models) also varied across managerial models within firms.

The model R2's were

higher in most cases for the top management and lower-level managers within
firms.

Middle-level manager models were the least consistent.

results from these analyses support hypothesis 1.

In total,

19

Insert Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 about here

Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Based on previous use of the construct and research evidence cited previously, environmental uncertainty, as perceived by managers, may be expected to
vary by firm, since the firms were in different industries and one was located
in a country different from the other two firms.
from each firm were:
ical (X • 21.63) (F

oil tools

= 4.10,

p

(X

Mean PEU scores for managers

= 21. 22); brewery

< .OS).

(X

= 18.15); and petrochem-

The ANOVA shows statistically signifi-

cant variance among the mean PEU scores.

However, Duncan's multiple range test,

used to examine where those differences occurred, failed to show significant
differences by firm.

The only element in the environment where differences were

detectable regarded the "clients" dimension.

The brewery managers had statisti-

cally significant lower perceived uncertainty with clients
either oil tools managers
20 • 91 ' p

(X"'

(X •

4.33) or petrochemical managers

2.33) than

(X=

4.05 (F ""

< •0 1 ) •

Although few differences in PEU were found by firm, differences in PEU by
management level were detected in the ANOVA.
level were:

lower-level managers

top managers

(X=

(X •

20.15) (F • 4.96, p

The mean PEU scores by management

22.19); middle managers

<

(X •

18.48); and

.02).

Major differences existed by management level in the perceived uncertainty

=

7.01, p

< .02),

"labor unions" (F

= 2.90,

p

of "clients" (F

appear in Table 9.

~s

<

"financial markets" (F

.07).

= 2.86,

p

< .07)

and

Results of Duncan's multiple range test

shown, lower-level managers perceived more general

environmental uncertainty than middle-level managers, but not as compared to
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top-level managers.

Lower-level managers perceived more environmental uncer-

tainty in the "clients" dimension than top or middle managers.

Lower-level

managers perceived more uncertainty in the financial markets than middle managers.

Finally, · top managers perceived more environmental uncertainty with labor

unions than middle managers.

These results support hypothesis 2.

Insert Table 9 about here

Given the results suggesting that perceptions of both strength and weakness
indicators and PEU vary by management level, it was important to determine if
PEU influences the strength and weakness indicators seen as important by managers.

Therefore, analyses were designed to test if PEU moderated the rela-

tionship between strength and weakness indicators (independent variables) and
managerial ratings of firm effectiveness (dependent variable).
Moderated regression analysis was used to test the moderating effect of PEU.
This analysis yields a conservative estimate of the moderating effects one
variable has on the relationship between two or more other variables (Darrow &
Kahl, 1983).

The dependent variable is regressed on a set of predictor

variables, a hypothesized moderator variable and a cross -product of thepreceding terms (y · · a+ bx + cz + dxz), where y is the dependent variable, xis
the independent variable, z is a hypothesized moderator variable and xz is the
interaction term (Bedeian, Mossholder, & Armenakis, 1983).

The purpose is to

determine if the addition of the interaction term increases the explanation of
the variance (R2) in the dependent variable significantly.
Results of the moderated regression analysis are shown in Table 10.
difference in R2 between the restricted (y

=a

+ bx + cz) and full (y

=a

The
+ bx +

cz + dxz) models was tested using the procedure recommended by Cohen 0968).

As
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shown, the difference in R2 was statistically significant.
ference in R2 was small (1.3 percent).

However, the dif-

Stone (1976) noted that moderating

effects of approximately one percent are negligible.
moderating effect may be considered insignificant.

Therefore, PEU's
As a result, additional

analyses were unnecessary.

_____________ ______________ _
....

Insert Table 10 about here

DISCUSSION
The normative view of strategy formulation processes has been examined
extensively.2

Horovitz 0984)

conclud~d

that much more is known about these

processes than those associated with strategy implementation.
Although popular, the validity of the normative view has been questioned.
Mintz berg ( 1973; 1978), Bower and Doz (1979), Bourgeois ( 1980), and Quinn (1980)
are among those suggesting deficiencies in the

norm~tive

view.

More recently,

Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) summarized many of these concerns.
The research study reported herein focused on one component included in the
normative approach to the formulation of strategies.

While some debate might

surface, most would agree that the identification of a firm's internal strengths
and its weakness is critical in the formulation of a strategy.
Higgins~

Some (e.g.,

1983) suggest that it is the first activity that should be completed

and others (e.g., Hitt and Ireland, in press) argue that strengths and

2In a recent work, Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) discussed the contributions key studies have made to what they labeled the "Strategy Formulation
School."
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weaknesses must be identified at both the corporate and business unit levels in
the multibusiness firm.

The position adopted herein is that lack of full

knowledge regarding appropriate application of the normative formulation process, and not the process itself, may account for concerns raised by Mintzberg
0973; 1978) and others.

More directly, this research was conducted to examine

the possibility that the strengths and weaknesses identified by managers at different levels within given firms are influenced by individuals cognitive
mas, biases and the information available to them.

sche~

Similarly, these

individualized-characteristics may affect the environmental uncertainty perceived by managers operating at different levels within an organization.
Results of this research suggest that the normative approach to the formulation of strategies may not be an appropriate descriptive model.

With addi-

tional knowledge, firms may be able to execute superior strategy formulation
processes.

While the same reasonin.g possibly could apply to other parts of

the normative strategy formulation process, this research focused only on
attempts to identify a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses.
Variance of strensths and weaknesses' indicators

.£l

managerial level

The first hypothesis suggested that perceptions of strengths and
weaknesses' indicators would be different among three managerial levels.
jointly, the results suppport

~his

Viewed

hypothesis.

The overall regression model showed only moderate agreement among managers.
The regression models for each of the management levels showed some agreement as
well as differences.

Six indicators (the interest and abilities demonstrated by

top management, the planning system, the abilities of employees, knowledge of
client's needs, services provided to clients and information on market share)
were common in each of the regression models for top, middle and lower level
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managers (although the indicator weightings varied among the models).
importance of these six indicators should perhaps be expected.

The

As a whole, they

reflect the firm's needs to evaluate external conditions, the necessity of
understanding the needs expressed by the firm's clients and the role a planning
system and top level managers' skills and commitments play in a firm's performance.
With respect to other indicators, differences were found.

For example, pro-

duct quality and the price-earnings index were shown to be important indicators
for top and lower level managers, but not for middle level managers.

It is not

surprising that product quality was selected as a critical indicator.

Those at

the top level must justify the quality of their firm's product to external
constituencies.

In the United States, for example, we have seen Lee Iacocca

appear orr national television and challenge consumers to buy an automobile
superior in quality to the Chrysler product, if one can be located.

Similarly,

the Ford Motor Company now suggests that "quality is job #1" in its firm.

For

lower level managers, product quality is ne-cessary since the technical core (the
area for which these individuals are responsible) often is buffered (Thompson,
1967) to assure successful operations.

In a similar manner, the importance of

the price-earnings index as a strength and weakness indicator for a top level
manager is understandable.
the lower level managers.

However, this indicator was weighted more heavily by
This finding simply may reflect an appreciation

for the importance of an often-used financial performance measure and the
influence the index may have on a firm's future.

The fact that neither one of

these indicators were found to be important by middle level managers is
interesting.

This finding may be a product of the primary responsiblilty

assigned to middle level managers.

l'hese individuals typically must voi.ce con-
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cerns of those below them to top level managers while simultaneously assuring
that top level managers' desired strategies and actions are implemented by those
operating in the firm's technical core.

Perhaps this "coordinating/integrating"

responsibility results in less attention being paid to the firm's actual output
(i.e., the quality of the product produced) and external judgements (e.g., the
price-earnings index) of the firm's performance.

Thus, the lower agreement

among middle managers regarding importance indicators may reflect the variability in their jobs and responsibilities.
Another example of differences among managerial levels is the lower level
managers' selection of two indicators (organizational form and structure and
employee activities) not chosen by other managers.

This suggests that the

manner in which work roles are segmented and then recombined, along with the
distribution of power across these roles (Galbraith and Nathanson; 1978) affects
lower level managers significantly.
structural configurations.

Clearly, their subordinates respond to

Apparently then, those who select structural forms

(top level managers) and those who assure their implementation (middle level
mangers) believe they are less important strength or weakness indicators for
a firm.

Differences among mangerial levels within each firm were also examined.
These results suggested greater variances by managerial level in the perception
of a firm's strengths and weaknesses indicators.

In the oil tools firm, for

example, only four indicators (the interest and abilities demonstrated by top
management, the planning system, knowledge of client's needs and information on
market share) were selected by managers at all three levels.
indicators appeared in these managers' models.

In total, fourteen

Of greater interest is the fact

that four other incidators were chosen only by lower level managers, while three
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others were included only in middle level managers' models.
The diversity is even more pronounced among subjects in the brewery and the
petrochemical firms.

Only one indicator (the planning system) appeared in all

three managerial levels' models in the brewery firm.
common to top and middle level managers.

Three indicators were

Interestingly, top managers included

three indicators in their models that were not selected by the remaining two
sets of managers while three other indicators were chosen by middle managers
alone.

Finally, no common indicators emerged between the two managerial levels

(top and middle) in the petrochemical company.
In total, the results suggest that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses
indicators can be expected to vary among three managerial levels.

As noted pre-

viously, perceptions of internal strengths and weaknesses are a critical input
to a firm's strategy formulation process.

The fact that indicators used to

identify strengths and weaknesses may not be consistent among managers is significant.

A firm's strengths represent those capabiltities that can become

disinctive competencies-- that is, what the firm can do better relative to its
competitors.

Hofer and Schendel 0978) suggest that distinctive competencies

must be exploited to gain a competive advantage.
Once identified, a firm's strength must be nurtured for it to become a
distinctive competence.

This is accomplished through a concentration of organi-

zational resources (Kiechel, 1982; Yavitz and Newman, 1982; Hitt and Ireland,
1984). Such an emphasis would be virtually impossible, however, if managers at
different levels in a firm do not agree on the indicators that reflect the
firm's strengths and weaknesses.

Efforts to form distinctive competencies con-

sistent with each managerial level's perception of the world would result in
misallocations of resources (and in turn, would impact negatively on financial
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performance).

Thus, these results suggest that managers' schemas and biases may

affect the formation of distinctive competencies.
Variances in perceptions of environmental uncertainty among managerial levels
Research evidence suggests that perceptions of the degree of uncertainty in
a firm's environment affect a firm's actions (Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967).

Among the actions affected are those involved with strate-

gic planning processes (Lindsay and Rue, 1980; Boulton et al., 1982), a firm's
strategic norms (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1983) and patterns of influence that
form within an organization (Hrebiniak and Snov, 1980).

Given this evidence,

coupled with the nature of this study's sample, it was expected that perceptions
of environmental uncertainty would vary among managers in different firms.
Further, evidence that uncertainty perceptions differ by administrative
hierarchial level (Cox et al., 1978) and indications that our perceptions of
today's environmental conditions are often thought to be highly consistent with
conditions identified in previous work experiences (Kielser and Sproul, 1982)
suggested that these perceptions would be different among top, middle and lower
level managers.
Managers in the three firms studied reflected a significant difference in
the perception of only one dimension (clients) of environmental

uncertainty.

This finding may suggest similarities in the external environmental conditions
faced by the three firms or that the differences are more systematic across
management levels than across firms.
The results showed differences in perceptions of environmental uncertainty
among individuals in different managerial levels, providing support for the
second hypothesis.

This suggests that managers' cognitive schemas do affect

one's perceptions of how much uncertainty is in the firm's environment.
Overall, lower level managers perceived significantly greater amounts of uncer-
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tainty as compared to those at the middle level, but not as compared to top
level managers.

Thus, the heuristics used by lower level managers, and the

kinds of information available to them, may influence perceptions of environmental uncertainty differently than those of middle level managers.
This finding is also of interest in light of Thompson's 0967) work.
Thompson suggested that organizations attempt to seal off, or buffer their fechnical cores from environmental disturbances.
ciency.

This is intended to increase effi-

These results may reflect a failure to buffer the cores in the three

firms studied.

The moderating effect of PEU on the perceptions of important

strengths and weakness indicators was minimal and was thus considered to be of
little consequence.
The practical implications of these results are obvious.

Those involved in

strategy formulation processes should recognize the possibility that managers'
cognitive schemas may affect their perceptions of uncertainty in external
environments.

Once recognized, efforts could be initiated to determine cogni-

tive elements contributing to the schemas and actions that are appropriate to
deal with these realities.
CONCLUSIONS
The normative model of strategy formulation holds that the process starts
with the assessment of a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses and its external opportunities and threats.

While other perspectives exist, the normative

model has undoubtedly been the most popular.
The present study examined the actual assessment of strengths and weaknesses
and environmental uncertainty by individual mana·gers at various levels in an
organization.

First, the reseachers established, on the basis of recent

research in cognitive psychology and results from organizational theory, that
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there are reasons to expect assessments of both the firm and its environment
to vary systematically as a function of organizational level.

Second, these

expectations were formalized as hypotheses and were tested in a sample of three
firms using managers with input to or involvement in the strategic planning process.

A "policy capturing" approach to these tests was used to circumvent the

problems associated with "espoused theories" as opposed to "theories in use''.
The statistical tests confirmed that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and
enviromental uncertainty do vary systematically as a function of organizational
level.
These results have far reaching consequences for both research and practice
in strategic management.
diate concern.

From a practical point of view two issues are of imme-

First, should the normative model be discarded in favor of an

alternative (what alternative?), given the ambiguous nature of assessments of
the firm and its enviroment?

Second, what is meant by "strengths and

weaknesses" and "opportunities and threats"?

Operationally, these terms are

partially dependent on theJ level of management doing the assessment.
assessment cannot be divorced from the assessor.

The

This issue cuts directly to

the design of strategic planning systems and processes.

Should systems be

designed to focus on the union or the intersection or some other set of
assessments?

Can assessments be weighted and combined?

How much and what kind

of input should be sought from the various levels of managers?

Questions such

as these, largely absent in the normative model, become highly salient in light
of the currrent research.
From a research perspective the current paper raises several interesting
issues.

Among these are the fact that these results call into question the use

of questionnaire approaches when conducting strategy research, wherein typically
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a single manager is asked to respond to questions about a firm, its strategy,
its planning process, or its environment.

Such studies obviously run a substan-

tial risk of measuring the perceptions of a sample of individuals rather than
the characteristics under study.

But then one is still left with the philo-

sophical issue of the "true" response, given the difficulty of separating the
assessment from the assessor.
An interesting research issue is the partition of the variance in perceptions of a particular variable such as strengths.

For example, how much of it

is due to industry effects, firm effects, managerial level, functional specialty, and individuual differences?

In this context, the current work is

merely a specialized study that raises the more general issue.
Overall the research reported herein suggests that much more investigation
is needed in the general area of perception and cognition.

How do managers

involved in strategy formulation processes perceive and conceptualize important
issues?

What are the relationships between perceptions, conception and reality?

How do schemas vary across firms and across managerial levels in a particular
firm?

Can "objective" approaches to strategic management, independent of the

particular manager, be developed?

These and related questions raise vital

issues that are as yet only modestly understood and in need of substantial
study.
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Table 2
Sample Case With Instruction$

Effectiveness Indicators
The purpose of this section is to obtain your rating of
the effectiveness of 30 hypothetical firms. Different information will be presented to you which '..rill help you in the
dete~mination of the effectiveness of ea~h firm.
It is expected
that an "effective" firm is considerably· different than an
"ineffective" firm according to the terms of the presented
information. A good distribution of effective, partially
effective, and ineffective firms are included.
Instructions: Assume that a managerial audit h<ts been conducted in each one of the 30 firms to analyze their strengths
and weaknesses.
The resulting data is presented in the form of a five
point scale (from poor to excellent) as ranked bv the auditors.
Pleasti·; read each one of the audit rcoorts. <.:.f.>n~ider the l!l!'ormati,m given for that particul.:tr finn and ev ;1iuate i.t:=; ef[~ct
i'\•.:.:t1ess Pll the seven point seal.; located at the end of the report. The1·e arc 30 firms; therefore, mc.:tsurP ym!t· t imc, ..:onsiJcr
the .inform:lti,)n before noting yuur judbmcnt and utilize the most
adequate point in the scale.
Example: If you consider that one of the firms \.;ras particularly
ineffective, put an X in the blank space to the far left, as
follows:
very
ineffective

X

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
effective

Should you consider another finn Vl.'ry l.•ffecllVL'., put: an X .in
the blank space to the far right, as r . . . llows:
very
ineffective
Firms with

X

T
HVl~ragc

2

5

7

l'ffl'<.:.tivcness may he

very
effective
(~v:-~lu;~tcd

thr,mgh

the use of one of the central blank spaces.
General Information
-----.
Si:nulated Firms:

About the

In order to assist in the evaluation of the simulated firms
the following must be assumed:

Table 2

Continued

1)

Each firm has essentially identical managerial objectives,
clients, external environment, etc.

2)

Since the audit reports contain data about _h_o_v, _w_e_l_l the
firm performs various activities (but not which activities
in particular), assume that each fi·rm performs activities
very similar to those of your firm~

3)

Remember that the information given in the
is in the form of poor. regular, etc.

audit report

Firm·n

Poor
1

1.
{I

2.

3.

The organizational
form and structure

The standard operating
procedures
The control system

s.

The planning system

6.

Employee activities

7.

The t t•chn i ctl ah iIi t .ies.
•'1111' I ll)'l'l' S

9.
10.

11.

2

Audit Report
Average Good · Excellent
5
4
J

_L

The interest and abilities
demonstrated by top
management

4.

8.

Bad

_L

_L

..1L
_L
_L

or

X

The numbe r o f
e::1ployees

X .

The .::~bil ities of
sales personnel

_L

Knowledge of
clients' needs

__x_

Product

qu.::~lity

- -'--'--· - - -- - - - - - --- - ··- - - ------ - - -

_L

Table 2

Continued

.-\udlt

Poor ·Bad
l
2
12.

13.

Services provided
to clients

Good

3

4

E:-:cellent
5

X

The industrial plant (size, energy,
equipment, etc.)

14.

Production techniques

15.

Product development

16.

Financing capacity

17.

The price-earnin gs
index

_x_

X

_x_
_x_
_L

18.

Growth tendencies

19.

Distributio n channels

20.

Relations with labor
unions

21.

R.:·r-o~rt

Average

X
X

X

The information about
market share

X

Please rate the effectivene ss of this firm on the following scale
by placing an X above the appropriate number.
Very
ineffective

1

·2

3

5

7

Very
effective

Table 3
lntercorrel ation Mntrix for Strength and

1

2
3
4

s
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

IS
16
17
18
19
20
21

2
.056

3
- . 321
- . 147

4
- .346

. 118
.113

6
5
. 022 -.206
. 017 -.012
. 027
. 046
.202 - .273
-. 207

8
7
-.015 .058
. 1 24 . 081
- . 246- . 134
. 089 .202
.317 .108
- . 178 - .172
-. 043

11
10
9
-.036 - . 099 .231
. 043 .034
- . 012
. 099 .076
,- .010
.136 -. 11 3 .030
. 301 - .23 S .156
. 085 -.490
- . 180
.258 -. 054 - .1 73
- . 31 2
. ~ 25 -.050
- . 372 -.127
.1 45

W~ak ness

12
-.042
-. 023
. 139
-.130
. 0:'8
-. 277
- .103
- . 083
- .192
. 180
.411

13
.080
-.08 7
-.211
-.031
.018
- . 136
.060
.1 24
. 141
. 148
. 11 7
.131

I ndi ca t ors

14
-.14 2
- . 046
. 252
. 01 6
. 056
.309
- . 002
- .006
- . 106
- .13 6
-. 157
- . 030
- .1 74

15
-.085
-.2 25
-.06 2
- . 334
. 122
. 228
-. 108
-. 235
-. 217
. 113
.234
• 284
.254
. 213

16
.270
- .109
. 179
-. 182
.250
-. 341
- . 099
. 11 6
. 204
- . 08 7
.074
.1 75
.071
- . 206
.008

17

-. on
. 385
. 076
. 024
-. 117
. 163
- . 34S
.1 Sit
-. 150
. 290
.0~8

- .350
- .189
- .011
-.045
-.1 50

18
- .162
- . 300
. 030
.073

- .Q04
-. 275

-. 174
. 0)3
-. 206
- . 004
. 187
. 133
- . E7
-.009
- . 100
. 026

-.308

19
.423
. 256
- . 22 3
-.453
. 130
. 076
. 316
-. 223
- . 046
- . 187
. 0 27

. 153
- . 03.:.
. 022
. 122
-. 095
. 063
- .loY

21
20
- .242 - .1)9
-.13 2 . J 2:
. 263 . 3 tl ~
-. 170 - .05•
.071 - . 1)(,_
.098 -. :Ji;
-.166 • 2:.:. ;-_
- .053 - . J>
- .016 . : 1 '1

-.1 99

-. 304
. 241

' 0 .
0

...

I. ..

. Jsc
0

~
-

l_

11 t":. l -

- .Ooo
-. 044 - .o:.s 1. 118 - . 08~ l
. o1 s -. o~ s 1
-. 12 7 . (1.;5 1
- . 0 53 . 012 l
-.'0!.1 .l l c 1
-. ~0~

2
2

Table 4
Regression Hodt'l of Si~ni.fic :mt Jndicators For
Internal Assessment-Overall Sample

S t rt'n)! 1·h & \\'<~akness
lnd i.cators

6

F

IS

.35

160.69**

112

.20

50 . 69**

117

.19

20.60**

12

. 18

44.32**

19

.16

43.26**

121

.14

·21. 06**

no

.14

37.35**

Il

.10

9.96**

115

.09

9.60**

Ill

.08

10.06**

118

• 07

5.07*

-.06

4.38*

17

F

= 75.20**

d. f.

= 13,1636

R2 = 0.375
*p <0.05
**P <0.01

Table 5
Regress.ion Models of Strength and Weakness
Indicators for Each of the Three Management
Levels

- -·- ··-- ·------- -·- -- ...... --- ... --

Strength & Weakness
Indicators

Top
1-fa.nagement
SRC

Middle

~tanagement

SRC

11
I2

Lm.rer-Level
·'1anagement
_SRC
.13**

.14**

.18*

.08*

.30**

.46**

.39**
.09*

-.16**

-.17**

I3
14
IS
.!6
I7
I8
I9

.13**

.08*

.21**

110

.21**

.13**

.16**

Ill

.13*

Il2

.19**

.19**
.14*

.29**

113
!14
115
116
117

.17*

• 24**

118
119

.15*

120
121

*P
**p
SRC:

.18**

.24**

F = 23.26**
d. f ~ = 11,348
R • .43

F = 47.7R**
d. f.= 7, 712
R2= .32

<.os
< .01

Standardized Regression Coefficient

.14**

4S.54•i

F =
d. f.= 10,559
R2= .45

Table 10
Moderated Regression Analysis with
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty as the Moderator
:
AR2

Model
Restricted

.383
• 01"3

.396

Full

**P

<.01

F

1.892**
(42,1607.)

The following papers are currently available in the Edwin L. Cox School of
Business Working Paper Series.
79-100

"Microdata File Merging Through Large-Scale Network Technology," by
Richard S. Barr and J. Scott Turner

79-101

"Perceived Environmental Uncertainty: An Individual or Environmental
Attribute," by Peter Lorenzi, Henry P. Sims, Jr., and John W. Slocum,
Jr.

79-103

"A Typology for Integrating Technology, Organization and Job Design,"
by John W. Slocum,
Jr., and Henry P. Sims, Jr.
I

80-100

"Implementing the Portfolio (SBU) Concept," by Richard A. Bettis and
William K. Hall

80-101

"Assessing Organizational Change Approaches: Towards a Comparative
Typology," by Don Hellriegel and John W. Slocum, Jr.

80-102

"Constructing a Theory of Accounting--An Axiomatic Approach," by
Marvin L. Carlson and James W. Lamb

80-103

"Mentors & Managers," by Michael E. McGill

80-104

"Budgeting Capital for R&D:
John W. Kensinger

80-200

"Financial Terms of Sale and Control of Marketing Channel
by Michael Levy and Dwight Grant

80-300

"Toward An Optimal Customer Service Package," by Michael Levy

80-301

"Controlling the Performance of People in Organizations," by Steven
Kerr and John W. Slocum, Jr.

80-400

"The Effects of Racial Composition on Neighborhood Succession," by
Kerry D. Vandell

80-500

"Strategies of Growth:
Richard D. Miller

80-600

"Organization Roles, Cognitive Roles, and Problem-Solving Styles,"
by Richard Lee Steckroth, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Henry P. Sims, Jr.

80-601

''New Efficient Equations to Compute the Present Value of Mortgage
Interest Payments and Accelerated Depreciation Tax Benefits," by
Elbert B. Greynolds, Jr.

80.;...800

"Mortgage Quality and the Two-Earner Family:
by Kerry D. Vandell

80- 801

"Comparison of the EEOCC Four-Fifths Rule and A One, Two or Three o
Binomial Criterion," by Marion Gross Sobol and Paul Ellard

80-900

"Bank Portfolio Management: The Role of Financial Futures," by
Dwight M. Grant and George Hempel

An Application of Option Pricing," by
Conflict~"

Forms, Characteristics and Returns," by

Issues and Estimates,"

82-101

"Modern Financial Theory, Corporate Strategy, and Public Policy:
Three Conundrums," by Richard A. Bettis

82-102

"Children's Advertising: The Differential Impact of Appeal Strategy,"
by Thomas E. Barry and Richard F. Gunst

82-103

"A Typology of Small Businesses: Hypothesis and Preliminary Study,"
by Neil C. Churchill and Virginia L. Lewis

82-104

"Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing:
and Extension," by Kerry D. Vandell

82-200

"Equilibrium in a Futures :t-farket," by Jerome Baesel and Dwight Grant

82-201

"A Market Index Futures Contract and Portfolio Selection," by Dwight
Grant

82-202

"Selecting Optimal Portfolios with a Futures Market in a Stock Index,"
by Dwight Grant

82-203

"Market Index Futures Contracts:
by Dwight Grant

82-204

"Optimal Sequential Futures Trading," by Jerome Baesel and Dwight
Grant

82-300

"The Hypothesized Effects of Ability in the Turnover Process," by
Ellen F. Jackofsky and Lawrence H. Peters

82-301

"Teaching a Financial Planning Language as the Principal Computer
Language for MBA's," by Thomas E. Perkins and Paul Gray

82-302

"Put Budgeting Back Into Capital Budgeting," by Michael F. van Breda

82-400

"Information Dissemination and Portfolio Choice," by Robert H. Jennings
and Christopher B. Barry

82-401

"Reality Shock: The Link Between Socialization and Organizational
Commitment," by Roger A. Dean

82-402

"Reporting on the Annual Report," by Gail E. Farrelly and Gail B.

82-403

"A Linguistic Analysis of Accounting," by Gail E. Farrelly

82-600

"The Relationship Between Computerization and Performance: A Strategy
for Maximizing the Economic Benefits of Computerization," by William
L. Cron and Marion G. Sobol

82-601

"Optimal Land Use Planning," by Richard B. Peiser

82-602

"Variances and Indices," by Michael F. van Breda

82-603

"The Pricing of Small Business Loans," by Jonathan A. Scott

82-604

"Collateral Requirements and Small Business Loans," by Jonathan A. Scott

82-605

"Validation Strategies for l-1ultiple Regression Analysis:
by Harion G. Sobol

A Comment

Some Thoughts on Delivery Dates,"

l~right

A Tutorial,"

82-700

"Credit Rationing and the Small Business Community,., by Jonathan A.
Scott

82-701

"Bank Structure and Small Business Loan Markets," by William C.
Dunkelberg and Jonathan A. Scott

82-800

"Transportation Evaluation in Community Design: An Extension with
Equilibrium Route Assignment," by Richard B. Peiser

82-801

"An Expanded Commercial Paper Rating Scale: Classification of
Industrial Issuers," by John W. Peavy, III and S. Michael Edgar

82-802

"Inflation, Risk, and Corporate Profitability: Effects on Common
Stock Returns," by David A. Goodman and John W. Peavy, III

82-803

"Turnover and Job Performance:
Ellen F. Jackofsky

82-804

"An Empirical Evaluation of Statistical Matching Methodologies," by
Richard S. Barr, William H. Stewart, and John Scott Turner

82-805

"Residual Income Analysis: A Method of Inventory Investment Allocation and Evaluation," by Michael Levy and Charles·A. Ingene

82-806

"Analytical Review Developments in Practice: Misconceptions, Poten.t ial Applications, and Field Experience," by Wanda Wallace

82-807

"Using Financial Planning Languages for Simulation," by Paul Gray

82-808

"A Look at How Managers' Minds Work," by John W. Slocum, Jr. and
Don Hellriegel

82-900

"The Impact of Price Earnings Ratios on Portfolio Returns," by John
W. Peavy, III and David A. Goodnum

82-901

"Replicating Electric Utility Short-Term Credit Ratings," by John W.
Peavy, III and S. Michael Edgar

82-902

"Job Turnover Versus Company Turnover: Reassessment of the March
and Simon Participation Model," by Ellen F. Jackofsky and Lawrence
H. Peters

82-903

"Investment Management by Multiple Managers: An Agency-Theoretic
Explanation," by Christopher B. Barry and Laura T. Starks

82-904

"The Senior Marketing Officer- An Academic Perspective," by James
T. Rothe

82-905

"The Impact of Cable Television on Subscriber and Nonsubscriber Behavior," by James T. Rothe, Michael G. Harvey, and George C. Michael

82-110

"Reasons for Quitting: A Comparison of Part-Time and Full-Time
Employees," by James R. Salter, Lawrence H. Peters, and Ellen F.
Jackofsky

82-111

"Integrating Financial Portfolio Analysis with Product Portfolio
Models," by Vijay Mahajari and Jerry Wind

An Integrated Process Model," by

82-112

"A Non-Uniform Influence Innovation Diffusion Model of New Product
Acceptance," by Christopher J. Easingwood, Vijay Mahajan, and Eitan
Muller

82-113

"The Acceptability of Regression Analysis as Evidence in a Courtroom Implications for the Auditor," by Wanda A. Wallace

82-114

"A Further Inquiry Into the Market Value and Earnings' Yield Anomalies,"
by John W. Peavy, III and David A. GOodman

82-120

"Compensating Balances, Deficiency Fees and Lines of Credit:
tional Model," by Chun H. Lam and Kenneth J. Boudreaux

82-121

"Toward a Formal Model of Optimal Seller Behavior in the Real Estate
Transactions Process," by Kerry Vandell

82-122

"Estimates of the Effect of School Desegregation Plans on Housing
Values Over Time," by Kerry D. Vandell and Robert H. Zerbst

82-123

"Compensating Balances, Deficiency Fees and Lines of Credit," by Chun
H. Lam and Kenneth J. Boudreaux

83-100

"Teaching Software System Design:
Thomas E. Perkins

83-101

"Risk Perceptions of Institutional Investors," by Gail E. Farrelly and
William R. Reichenstein

83-102

"An Interactive Approach to Pension Fund Asset Management," by David A.
Goodman and John W. Peavy, III

83-103

"Technology, Structure, and Workgroup Effectiveness: A Test of a
Contingency Model," by Louis W. Fry and John W. Slocum, Jr.

83-104

"Environment, Strategy and Performance: An Empirical Analysis in Two
Service Industries," by William R. Bigler, Jr. and Banwari L. Kedia

83-105

"Robust Regression: Method and Applications," by Vijay Mahajan,
Subhash Sharma, and Jerry Wind

83-106

"An Approach to Repeat-Purchase Diffusion Analysis," by Vijay Mahajan,
Subhash Sharma, and Jerry Wind

83-200

"A Life Stage Analysis of Small Business Strategies and Performance,"
by Rajeswararao Chaganti, Radharao Chaganti, and Vijay Mahajan

83-201

"Reality Shock: When A New Employee's Expectations Don't Match
Reality," by Roger A. Dean and John P. Wanous

83-202

"The Effects of Realistic Job Previews on Hiring Bank Tellers," by
Roger A. Dean and John P. Wanous

83-203

"Systemic Properties of Strategy: Evidence and a Caveat From an
Example Using a Modif ied Miles-Snow Typology," by William R. Bigler, Jr.

83-204

"Differential Information and the Small Firm Effect," by Christopher
B. Barry and Stephen J. Brown

An Opera-

An Experiential Approach," by

83-300

"Constrained Classification: The Use of a Priori Information in
Cluster Analysis," by Wayne S. DeSarbo and Vijay Mahajan

83-301

"Substitutes for Leadership: A Modest Proposal for Future Investigations of Their Neutralizing Effects," by S. H. Clayton and D. L.
Ford, Jr.

83-302

"Company Homicides and Corporate Muggings: Prevention Through
Stress Buffering- Toward an Integrated Model," by D. L. Ford, Jr.
and S. H. Clayton

83-303

"A Comment on the Measurement of Firm Performance in Strategy Research," by Kenneth R. Ferris and Richard A. Bettis

83-400

"Small Businesses, the Economy, and High Interest Rates: Impacts
and Actions Taken in Response," by Neil C. Churchill and Virginia
L. Lewis

83-401

"Bonds Issued Between Interest Dates: What Your Textbook Didn't
Tell You," by Elbert B. Greynolds, Jr. and Arthur L. Thomas

83-402

"An Empirical Comparison of Awareness Forecasting Models of New
Product Introduction," by Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller, and Subhash
Sharma

83-500

"A Closer Lool-;. at Stock-For-Debt Swaps," by John W. Peavy III and
Jonathan A. Scott

83-501

"Small Business Evaluates its Relationship with Commercial Banks,"
by William C. Dunkelberg and Jonathan A. Scott

83-502

"Small Business and the Value of Bank-Customer Relationships," by
William C. Dunkelberg and Jonathan A. Scott

83-503

"Differential Infor1ll.ation and the Small Firm Effect," by Christopher
B. Barry and Stephen J. Brown

83-504

"Accounting Paradigms and Short-Term Decisions:
Study," by Michael van Breda

83-505

"Introduction Strategy for New Products with Positive and Negative
Word-Of-Mouth," by Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller and Roger A. Kerin

83-506

"Initial Observations from the Decision Room Project," by Paul Gray

83-600

"A Goal Focusing Approach to Analysis of Integenerational Transfers
of Income: Theoretical Development and Preliminary Results," by A.
Charnes, W. W. Cooper, ·J. J. Rousseau, A. Schinnar, and N. E.
Terleckyj

83-601

"Reoptimization Procedures for Bounded Variable Primal Simplex Network Algorithms," by A. Iqbal Ali, Ellen P. Allen, Richard S. Barr,
and Jeff L. Kennington

83-602

''The Effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Small Business
Loan Pricing," by Jonathan A. Scott

A Preliminary

83-800

"Multiple Key Informants' Perceptions of Business Environments,"
by WilliamL. Cron and John W. Sloctnn, Jr.

83-801

11

83-802

"Bank Performance in the Emerging Recovery: A Changing Risk-Return
Environment," by Jonathan A. Scott and George H. Hempel

83-803

"Business Synergy and Profitability," by Vijay Mahajan and Yoram
Wind

83-804

"Advertising, Pricing and Stability in Oligopolistic Markets for
New Products," by Chaim Fershtman, Vijay Mahajan, and Eitan Muller

83-805

"How Have The Professional Standards Influenced Practice?," by Wanda·
A. Wallace

83-806

"What Attributes of an Internal Auditing Department Significantly
Increase the Probability of External Auditors Relying on the Internal
Audit Department?," by Wanda A. Wallace

83-807

"Building Bridges in Rotary," by Michael F. van Breda

83-808

"A New Approach to Variance Analysis," by Michael F. van Breda

83-809

"Residual Income Analysis: A Method of Inventory Investment Allocation and Evaluation," by Michael Levy and Charles A. · Ingene

83-810

"Taxes, Insurance, and Corporate Pension Policy," by Andrew H. Chen

83-811

"An Analysis of the Impact of Regulatory Change: The Case of
Natural Gas Deregulation," by Andrew H. Chen and Gary C. Sanger

83-900

"Networks with Side Constraints: An LU Factorization Update," by
Richard S. Barr, Keyvan Farhangian, and Jeff L. Kennington

83-901

"Diversification Strategies and Managerial Rewards:
Study," by Jeffrey L. Kerr

83-902

"A Decision Support System for Developing Retail Promotional Strategy,"
by Paul E. Green, Vijay Mahajan, Stephen M. Goldberg, and Pradeep K.
Kedia

33-903

"Network Generating Models for Equipment Replacement," by Jay E.
Aronson and Julius S. Aronofsky

83-904

"Differential Information and Security Market Equilibrium," by
Christopher B. Barry and Stephen J. Brown

83-905

"Optimization Methods in Oil and Gas Development," by Julius S.
Aronofsky

83-906

"Benefits and Costs of Disclosing Capital Investment Plans in
Corporate Annual Reports," by Gail E. Farrelly and Marion G. Sobol.

Predicting Salesforce Reactions to New Territory Design According
to Equity Theory Propositions," by William L. Cron

An Empirical

83-907

"Security Price Reactions Around Corporate Spin-Off Announcements,"
by Gailen L. Hite and James E. Owers

83-908

"Costs and,their Assessment to Users of a Medical Library: Recovering
Costs from Service Usage," by E. Bres, A. Charnes, D. Cole Eckels,
S. Hitt, R. Lyders, J. Rousseau, K. Russell and M. Schoeman

83-110

''Microcomputers in the Banking Industry," by Chun H. Lam and George
H. Hempel

83~111

"Current and Potential Application of Microcomputers in Banking -Survey Results," by Chun H. Lam and George H. Hempel

83-112

"Rural Versus Urban Bank Performance: An Analysis of Market Competition
for Small Business Loans," by Jonathan A. Scott and William C. Dunkelberg

83-113

"An Approach to Positivity and Stability Analysis in DEA," by A. Charnes,
W. W. Cooper, A. Y. Lewin, R. C. Morey, and J. J. Rousseau

83-114

"The Effect of Stock-for-Debt on Security Prices," by John W. Peavy, III
and Jonathan A. Scott

83-115

"Risk/Return Performance of Diversified Firms," by Richard A. Bettis
and Vijay Mahajan

83-116

"Strategy as Goals-Means Structure and Performance: An Empirical
Examination," by William R. Bigler, Jr. and Banwari L. Kedia

83-117

"Collective Climate: Agreement as a Basis for Defining Aggregate
Climates in Organizations," by William F. Joyce and John W. Slocum, Jr.

83-118

"Diversity and Performance:
and Richard A. Bettis

83-119

"Analyzing Dividend Policy: A Questionnaire Survey," by H. Kent
Baker, Richard B. Edelman, and Gail E. Farrelly

83-120

"Conglomerate Merger, Wealth Redistribution and Debt," by Chun H. Lam
and Kenneth J. Boudreaux

83-121

"Differences Between Futures and Forward Prices: An Empirical Investigation of the Marking-To-Market Effects," by Hun Y. Park and Andrew H.
Chen

83..;122

"The Effect of Stock-for-Debt Swaps on Bank Holding Companies," by
Jonathan A. Scott, George H. Hempel, and John W. Peavy, III

84-100

"The Low Price Effect: Relationship with Other Stock Market Anomalies,"
by David A. Goodman and John W. Peavy, III

84-101

"The Risk Universal Nature of the Price-Earnings Anomaly," by David A.
Goodman and John W. Peavy, III

84-102

"Business Strategy and the Management of the Plateaued Performer," by
John W. Slocum, Jr., William L. Cron, Richard W. Hansen, and Sallie
Rawlings

84-103

''Financial Planning for Savings and Loan Institutions -- A New Challenge,"
by Chun H. Lam and Kirk R. Karwan

The Elusive Linkage," by C. K. Prahalad

84-104

"Bank Performance as the Economy Rebounds," by Jonathan A. Scott and
George H. Hempel

84-105

"The Optimality of Multiple Investment Managers:
by Christopher B. Barry and Laura T. Starks

84-200

"Microcomputers in Loan Management," by Chun H. Lam and George H. Hempel

84-201

"Use of Financial Planning Languages for -the Optimization of Generated
Networks for Equipment Replacement," by Jay E. Aronson and Julius S.
Aronofsky

84-300

"Real Estate Investment Funds: Performance and Portfolio Considerations,"
by W. B. Brueggeman, A. H. Chen, and T. G. Thibodeau

84-301

"A New Wrinkle in Corporate Finance: Leveraged Preferred Financing;"
by Andrew H. Chen and John W. Kensinger

84-400

"Reaching the Changing Woman Consumer: An Experiment in Advertising,"
by Thomas E. Barry, Mary C. Gilly and Lindley E. Doran

84-401

"Forecasting, Reporting, and Coping with Systematic Risk," by
Sobol and Gail E. Farrelly

84-402

"Managerial Incentives in Portfolio Management: A New Motive for the Use
of Multiple Managers," by Christopher B. Barry and Laura T. Starks

84-600

"Understanding Synergy: A Conceptual and Empirical Research Proposal,"
by William R. Bigler, Jr.

84-601

"Managing for Uniqueness:
R. Bigler, Jr.

84-602

"Firm Performance Measurement Using Trend, Cyclical, and Stochastic
Components," by Richard A. Bettis and Vijay Mahajan
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